Status: APPROVED
In the Fall of 2025, both the Finance and Corporate Services Committee and Council approved the Lansdowne 2.0 redevelopment and construction plan.
On November 7, councillors voted 15 to 10 to proceed, despite the Auditor General’s concerns, expert input from the public, and a survey by Nanos Research that demonstrated 70% of respondents opposed the project when given more information.
Those who voted Yes at Council were David Hill, Steve Desroches, Tim Tierney, Matthew Luloff, David Brown, Allan Hubley, Isabelle Skalski, Laura Dudas, Clarke Kelly, Stéphanie Plante, Marty Carr, Cathy Curry, Glen Gower, Catherine Kitts and Mayor Mark Sutcliffe.
When the results were mapped to city wards, it revealed a great divide between urban No votes and suburban/rural Yes votes.
The plan and the process were flawed. The Auditor General’s report was released after the Finance Committee meeting — denying members the opportunity to take her findings into account. The report highlighted many concerns: insufficient contingency, a risk of cost overruns, lost opportunity cost to dedicate funds to other priorities, and a risk that the developer could withdraw. The report made clear that Ottawa taxpayers would entirely fund Lansdowne 2.0; something the mayor consistently denied. It also referred to the historical losses of the City/OSEG partnership. The partnership’s annual report for 2024 (released October 2025) revealed a net loss of $11.1 million for the 2024/25 fiscal year, with average annual losses since 2014 estimated at $10 million. The report did identify potential revenue streams that might offset these public expenditures, but none of these are guaranteed and, even in the best-case scenario, no significant revenues are expected for 25 years.
The City did not receive a cent of the promised income from the Lansdowne 1.0 “Waterfall” financial model.
A huge number of delegations were made to the Finance and Corporate Services Committee and Council meetings, including from ReImagine Ottawa. These pointed out, in addition to the project’s financial risk, the City’s $10 billion infrastructure gap, the absurdity of projecting income and costs over a 50-year period, the lack of a traffic plan, a minimal contribution to affordable housing, the secrecy of the contractual arrangements, lack of alternatives, the loss of green space, the impact of another sports and entertainment venue downtown, and that the 2,000 fewer seats in the arena make it unviable for the Professional Women’s Hockey team, The Charge.
One of the most troubling aspects of the final few weeks was the City’s rush to decision-making without meaningful public input. The mayor held a press conference releasing his views and selected details about the finances before the reports were made available to the media or the public. An extremely compressed schedule limited the time for the public and councillors to review hundreds pages of dense documentation.
Those who worked so hard for a better Lansdowne have concluded that the only solution for more responsible development decisions is at the ballot box. ReImagine Ottawa, in concert with other advocacy organizations, will work toward electing a council better attuned to community needs in November 2026. Help us if you can!
The Lansdowne project history
In September 2007, cracks were discovered in Frank Clair Stadium, and a portion of the south-side stands was demolished due to safety concerns. The City of Ottawa subsequently initiated an international design competition to redevelop Lansdowne Park.
However, it suspended the competition when a group of Ottawa businessmen known as the Ottawa Sports and Entertainment Group (OSEG) proposed a public-private partnership with the City. They had been promised a Canadian Football League franchise if they secured a home venue in Ottawa. The partnership would finance the annual upkeep and construction costs of the stadium and redevelopment of the grounds with income from residential and commercial uses.
Lansdowne 1.0 proved to be a financial failure. The City received $0.0 return on its investment under the waterfall, and OSEG claimed that it needed to invest more than anticipated under its obligation to maintain the facilities. The pandemic amplified the financial strain on the partnership.
Lansdowne 2.0, with two massive residential towers and 59,000 S.F. of retail space is designed to make it profitable. With a $100 million debt still outstanding from 1.0 and new financial commitments to 2.0, the total is around $500 million. If the LRT and the new library are any indication, this early estimate will balloon into a tax timebomb. One industry insider predicts the final bill will be as high as $1.5 billion.
In July 2021, Council directed City staff to work with OSEG and with community stakeholders to develop a plan to bring the City/OSEG partnership into financial viability. However, City staff did not consult with the stakeholder group during the course of drawing up plans for Lansdowne 2.0. Instead, after almost a year of silence, the City released its report one week before tabling it with the City’s Financial and Economic Development Committee (FEDCO) for approval. When questioned, the City cited protracted confidential negotiations with OSEG and said that the City had “run out of time.”
At the FEDCO meeting, Councillor Menard attempted introduce a motion to delay a decision, but none of the councillors present supported him. Mayor Watson refused to allow it to be read. FEDCO approved the report.
The Lansdowne 2.0 project was moved forward by City Council on November 10, 2023 with two rather than three residential towers and changes to the financing model. The City will take on the risk for potential construction cost overruns. Ottawa Citizen article.In February 2025, the Ottawa Auditor General presented to Council her findings of an audit of the financing plan and related due diligence. The key findings were:
- City’s Responsibility for Costs: The Auditor General noted that the city is responsible for construction cost overruns on Lansdowne 2.0.
- Optimism Bias: The audit highlighted the risk of “optimism bias,” a phenomenon where project costs and risks are underestimated, which is especially relevant for large infrastructure projects like this one.
- Rising Construction Costs: The 2024 audit noted that estimated construction costs may have already surpassed the original projections, partly due to an increase in construction costs per square foot that was higher than the escalation figure management had used in its estimates.
- Opportunity Cost: A follow-up report in November 2025 raised concerns about the “opportunity cost” of the city setting aside millions of dollars per year to service debt for the project, suggesting that money could be used for other city priorities.